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Abstract
We propose a method for measuring the conjectural errors that inexpert consumers make relative to experts in
using observable product characteristics as surrogate indicators of a valued unobservable characteristic.
Observations on the unobservable characteristic, available to the researcher but not consumers, are used to divide
the data into high- and low-quality subsamples. Separate hedonic estimation on the subsamples enables
measurement of the relative valuations and conjectures of experts and non-experts with respect to indicators
under the assumption that consumers sort across quality grades based on their appraisal expertise. The method is
demonstrated using a small sample of SKU-level data on the dietary supplement black cohosh. Our exploratory
findings on this sample suggest that, relative to experts, inexpert consumers underestimate the value of most
observable characteristics as indicators of black cohosh chemical authenticity; however they overweight
therapeutic claims on the product label as a negative indicator of authenticity.
Keywords: consumer behavior, expertise, surrogate indicators, missing information, credence goods, hedonic
analysis
1. Introduction
Prices indicate the product characteristics that consumers value, but they do not tell us why consumers value
them. While in some cases consumers might value a characteristic intrinsically, in other cases characteristics are
valued as a signal, or surrogate indicator, of the level of some quality that is not directly observable. For example,
a knowledgeable owner of a porcelain vase may find its shape and painted decoration aesthetically pleasing;
meanwhile, she may value the vase’s thickness as an indicator of its authenticity as an artifact of the Ming
Dynasty, rather than, say, because it makes the vase more durable or beautiful (Brook, 1998, pp. 225-226).
Traditional hedonic analysis, which deals in the valuation of observable qualities, would tell us only that
consumers value thickness in a vase. Moreover, additional questions relevant to marketing arise in the context of
unobservable qualities that the standard hedonic approach does not answer. Do consumers accord full value to a
characteristic as an indicator of an unobserved quality, or do they undervalue it as such because they are unaware
or tentative with respect to the characteristic’s indicator capabilities? Do consumers, on the other hand, accord
too much value to the characteristic as an indicator and rely too heavily on it? Do different consumers make
different conjectures in this regard? If so, how does one identify the different consumers? To answer these
questions, it is necessary, inter alia, to measure the quality unobservable to consumers – in the Ming vase
example, authenticity – something that is not an element of traditional hedonic analysis.
This paper demonstrates a method for extracting information on consumers’ use of observable product
characteristics as surrogate indicators. It makes use of data measuring authenticity (i.e., whether the product
contains the key ingredients claimed on the label) for a sample of brands of black cohosh, a dietary supplement
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believed to help with menopause symptoms. Black cohosh is properly characterized as a credence good, or
product for which key quality-related characteristics (such as botanical authenticity) are not observable even
after purchase and use (Darby & Karni, 1973; Dulleck & Kerschbamer, 2006). We obtain data on authenticity in
the laboratory through a standard analytical method called high-performance liquid chromatography. Thus we
observe a critical quality-related product characteristic that consumers have not. While this may appear at first
blush to present a unique situation, data on consumer-unobservable characteristics are similarly available to
researchers in many typical marketing contexts. As experts on their categories, product manufacturers often have
superior information on the quality of competing products relative to consumers. Sophisticated quality
measurement techniques, such as those used by Consumer Reports and other independent testers, while
infeasible for most consumers, may be feasible for researchers.
Two problems complicate the process of empirical inference in this context. The first is, as suggested by the
above discussion, that consumers are not generally expert appraisers of key unobservable qualities. Consumers
may be unaware of the need to appraise a certain unobservable quality, or unaware that information at their
disposal from observable characteristics could provide insight into it. (Note 1) Or, they may be aware that an
observable characteristic can help in appraisal of an unobservable quality, but they may not know in what way or
to what extent. If this last holds true, then the econometric relationship between the indicators and the
unobserved quality is not the one consumers conjecture, hence that relationship does not provide an accurate
basis for determining how the indicator variables are being valued by the market.
We classify inexpert appraisal using surrogate indicators into three cases. A consumer might overshoot,
overestimating the power of the surrogate indicator to predict the unobservable characteristic. Or she might
undershoot, underestimating its power of prediction. Or she might entertain a fallacy, reversing in her prediction
the true sign of the relationship between surrogate indicator and unobservable characteristic. Expert appraisal is
nested in this structure as a boundary sub-case between “overshoot” and “undershoot,” while unawareness is a
boundary sub-case between “undershoot” and “fallacy.”
The second problem is that consumers are not all the same. Some are more expert than others. This means
hedonic analysis, which relies on the assumption that consumers express homogenous preferences, is
inappropriate when applied indiscriminately to the mass of consumers. (Note 2) Moreover, the problem of
inferring consumers’ conjectures becomes complex, since those conjectures vary across consumers.
We extract information about different consumers’ use of surrogate indicators by inferring consumers’ expertise
levels from their choices. Consumers with greater appraisal expertise are better at discerning quality, and so sort
disproportionately to higher quality products. This enables the researcher to measure the surrogate indicator
valuations and conjectural errors of inexpert consumers relative to experts by separately performing hedonic
analysis on high- and low-quality product pools. Importantly, this process constitutes a justifiable use of the
hedonic model assuming consumers’ effective preferences within quality pool are sufficiently homogeneous. We
demonstrate the method using separate estimation on authentic and non-authentic black cohosh subsamples.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of relevant literatures. Section 3
lays out a model of unobservable characteristics and surrogate indicators, examines the empirical problem posed
by inexpert consumer appraisal, and considers how a hedonic approach predicated on consumer sorting
addresses the problem. In Section 4, we apply our approach to the market for black cohosh. Section 5 concludes
by discussing managerial implications, limitations of the current study, and possible objectives for future
research.
2. Literature Review
The marketing literature on expertise provides a useful background on this decision-maker trait and its relevance.
Alba & Hutchinson (1987) define five dimensions of consumer expertise that are influenced by product
familiarity. Mitchell & Dacin (1996) offer experimental evidence of the effect of expertise on consumers’
performance at predictive tasks. They also provide an excellent review (p. 219) of the psychological literature
relating expertise to performance levels in various cognitive functional areas. Additional evidence of the
relationship of expertise to consumer performance is offered by Chiou (2003); Maheswaran (1994); and
Maheswaran, Sternthal, & Gürhan (1996).
The idea that consumers sort across quality grades based on differences in expertise or ability is not new.A
number of theoretical analyses have considered market outcomes in situations in which some consumers are
inattentive, unskilled, or otherwise experience higher costs to evaluating market information than others
(Armstrong & Chen, 2009; Gabaix & Laibson, 2006; Nagler, 1993; Salop & Stiglitz, 1977). One consistent
finding across this literature is that people with different abilities select different products (or, more generally,
20
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product choice strategies), such that more skilled, less cost-encumbered individuals get better deals than those
less skilled and more cost-encumbered. The present paper’s innovation is to advance an empirical methodology
that uses sorting as a tool to extract information relevant to managerial decision-making. One may apply the
methods developed in this study to create targeted pricing, product and promotion strategies based on consumer
expertise levels. The methods may also be used to develop and evaluate public policies, particularly policies
related to marketing practices and consumer outcomes (see Section 5).
A number of researchers have studied the processes by which consumers infer product attributes for which
information is missing (e.g., Broniarczyk & Alba, 1994; Dick, Chakravarti, & Biehal, 1990; Johnson & Levin,
1985; Pinson, 1986; Ross & Creyer, 1992; Sanbonmatsu, Kardes, & Sansone, 1991; Sanbonmatsu, Kardes,
Houghton, Ho, & Posavac, 2003). A literature specifically devoted indicators of product quality focuses largely
on how different surrogate indicators, such as country-of-origin and perceived difficulty of manufacture,
influence consumers’ perceptions of unobservable quality (e.g., Jo, 2005; Johnson & Folkes, 2007; Quester,
Dzever, & Chetty, 2000; West, Larue, Gendron, & Scott, 2002).Much of the research emphasis has been on the
role of price as an indicator of quality; analyses have included experimental studies (e.g., Brucks, Zeithaml, &
Naylor, 2000; West et al., 2002) and some meta-analytic reviews (Rao & Monroe, 1989; Völckner & Hofmann,
2007).By and large, the studies in these categories are descriptive: none provides a methodology for using data
on consumer-unobservable qualities as a tool for making inferences about consumers’ valuations and quality
judgments.
Another strand of work, related to the literature on the role of indicators, looks at the accuracy of consumer
perceptions. In a set of analyses involving both durable and non-durable goods, Burton & Lichtenstein (1989,
1990) considered how consumers’ perceptions of the price-quality relationship contrast with actual price-quality.
Mason, Burton, & Roach (2001) examined the determinants of consumers’ accuracy at judging brand
performance on various attributes. One thing these studies have in common is that they ascertain consumer
accuracy using as benchmarks for “objective” quality measures that are publicly available to consumers – for
example, ratings in Consumer Reports. The present paper is unique in that its measure of objective quality is one
that consumers could not possibly have observed themselves; thus we eliminate the possibility that consumers
may have improved their accuracy by “peeking” at the objective measures.
3. Conceptual Framework and Approach
3.1 Unobservable Product Qualities
The standard hedonic approach posits a continuum of differentiated products, perfect competition, complete
information, and consumers with homogeneous preferences who value a product as a bundle of characteristics
(Rosen, 1974; Kristensen, 1984). Let us stipulate to these assumptions for the moment, and specifically let us
consider a differentiated product space consisting of K observable characteristics, X k , k=1,…,K, and one
unobservable characteristic, z. Thus the utility the representative consumer obtains from consuming the product
is given by



U  U X 1 ,..., X K , z



(1)

Maximization of (1) subject to a budget constraint produces a hedonic price function, for brand i,

pi  f  X1i ,..., X Ki , z 

(2)

where X k is the value of the kth characteristic for brand i and pi the price level for i(Huang and Lin 2007).
The corresponding hedonic log regression equation specifies
(3)
Pi    1 X 1i  ...   K X Ki   i
P

log
p
 is a stochastic disturbance term. Note that z does not enter this regression because it is
where i
i and
not observable. Estimation of the equation in (3) allows measurement of the extent to which the consumer values
increments in each of the observable variables, that is,  k  P X k . But, as discussed in the introduction, it
does not provide information on the extent to which observables are valued as indicators of z. Nor does one get
any sense as to how much the consumer values increments in z.
In general, the value of each observable characteristic X k provides information about the value of z, following
from some functional relationship





(4)
z  z X 1 ,..., X K
z

X
Assuming
k is nonzero, X k is said to be a surrogate indicator of z. If z X k  0 , then we say that
X k is a positive indicator of z. If z Xk  0 , X k is a negative indicator of z. We may therefore decompose the
partial derivative of P with respect to the X k in (3) as
21
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(5)

That is, the effect of each observable characteristic on the log price of the product is equal to the sum of its direct
effect as a quality with intrinsic value to the consumer and its indirect effect as a surrogate indicator to the
consumer of the valued unobservable characteristic (Note 3).
Now suppose we are able to privately observe z, so that z may be included along with the observable variables.
Then (3) becomes

Pi   D   z i  1D X 1i  ...   KD X Ki  i

(6)

where  is the stochastic disturbance term for the augmented equation. Also, approximating (4) with a linear
relationship, we may write a regression equation that determines the value of z,
(7)
z i  a  b1 X 1i  ...  bK X Ki   i
where  is a stochastic disturbance. In (6), the effect of the X k on log price through z is controlled for, so a
decomposition has been effected. The coefficients on the X k represent the direct effect of the X k on log price,
P  X k D , purged of the effect that the X k have as indicators of the value of z. Since the coefficient on z is
P z , it appears that by estimating (3) and (6), we would obtain each component in (5).
3.2 Inexpert Appraisal
The above estimation procedure makes a critical assumption that all consumers incorporate the full z  X k in
their valuation of the X k . This is because including z in (6) controls for the z  X k based on the actual
empirical relationship of z to the X k . Thus it assumes that consumers are aware of all the information each
observable characteristic provides about the value of z. This is true if consumers are expert appraisers of z, but it
is not true if they are not.
Let us continue to maintain the assumption of a single representative consumer, but allow that the consumer
might not be an expert appraiser of z. In light of this, it is necessary to be more precise about what we mean by
z  X k . Let us define z  X k T as the total information content that X k provides on z, which in turn may be
thought of as the sum of two components: z  X k A , the component the consumer is aware of or presumes in
her appraisal of z; and z  X k U , the component the consumer is unaware of (i.e., the gap between the actual
z  X k T and what the consumer presumes). With this newly defined structure, the decomposition in (5) is
re-written as

P  X k  P  X k

(8)
 P z  z  X k A
reflecting that the surrogate indicator influence of the X k on log prices occurs only through that portion of the
X k ’s explaining power that the consumer presumes.
Now it may be seen that estimation of (6) actually yields P  X k D  P z  z  X k U as the coefficients on
the X k , not the P  X k D ; the latter are unrecoverable without knowing the extent and nature of the consumer’s
D

inexpert use of each surrogate indicator X k . Put another way, estimation of (6) provides biased estimates of
the P  X k D , where the bias is given by  P z  z  X k U . The sign of the bias for each X k depends on
three things: whether the unobservable characteristic z is valued positively or negatively by the market (i.e., the
sign of P z ), whether X k is a positive or negative surrogate indicator of z (i.e., the sign of z  X k T ),
and the nature of consumers’ inexpertise in using X k to appraise z (i.e., the relationship of z  X k A
to z  X k ).
T

Delving into this last item in greater detail, let us assume that consumers exhibit a consistent form of inexpert
appraisal for each X k , that is, the relationship of z  X k A to z  X k T does not vary for a given k. We
classify this relationship into three mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive cases based on the value of

k 

   .
z

 Xk

z

A

 Xk

T

First, suppose  k  1 . This implies consumers sign the relationship between X k and z correctly but perceive
that X k moves z more than it actually does. In this case, consumers overshoot. Second, suppose  k   0,1 .
This implies consumers sign the relationship between X k and z correctly but perceive that X k moves z less
than it actually does. In this case, consumers undershoot. Third, suppose  k  0 . This implies consumers sign
the relationship between X k and z incorrectly – that is, they perceive z rises with X k when it actually falls, or
falls with X k when it actually rises. In this case, consumers are said to entertain a fallacy about the X k .
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Complete unawareness of a surrogate indicator would be represented by the borderline value  k  0 , while for
expert appraisers  k  1.
Table 1 summarizes the researcher’s potential bias outcomes based on this classification. For example, for a
positively valued unobservable characteristic and positive surrogate indicator, the estimate of P  X k D is
positively biased when consumers overshoot. Intuitively, this is because consumers assign more surrogate
indicator value to the variable then merited by its actual empirical relationship to the unobservable characteristic;
so their intrinsic valuation of the variable, as a component of overall valuation, is overestimated when the
estimation considers the actual empirical relationship instead of the perceived one. Note that while we may speak
of the biases in estimation conditional on each consumer conjecture, we normally are able to measure neither the
estimation bias nor the conjecture.
Table 1. Researcher’s bias in estimating ∂P ∂X k

k < 1

D

k > 1

∂P ∂z , ∂z ∂X k
T

Negative

Positive

∂P ∂z , ∂z ∂X k

Positive

Negative

same sign

opposite sign

T

The empirical conundrum created by consumers’ inexpertise may be viewed through another lens by estimating
(7), which shows the actual empirical relationship between the X k and z. This relationship, as we have
discussed, is generally not known to the non-expert consumer. Thus the coefficients on the X k are the
z  X k T rather than the z  X k A .In practical terms, though estimation of (7) may indicate a good fit of z
with the X k , it is not necessarily the case that consumers have in actuality obtained a good fix on z.
The measure of P z obtained from estimating (6) also reflects the conundrum. The coefficient varies with
two effects that are not separately identified: the consumer’s valuation of z, and the consumer’s composite
competence at using the surrogate indicators of z. Thus a small P z conflates consumer unawareness with
respect to z with consumer apathy. It is possible, moreover, that P z takes the “wrong” sign, that is, negative
for a characteristic that consumers value positively. This occurs when appraisal using available indicators is
sufficiently inexpert and fallacious that consumers perceive an unobservable characteristic to be more present
when it is in fact less present. Thus an unobservable characteristic desired by consumers could actually be valued
negatively by the market.
3.3 Differences in Appraisal Expertise
Let us now consider the possibility that not all consumers are equally inexpert: some may be expert appraisers
while others are less skilled. Generally, not all people will have the same exposures or experiences that enable
them to learn. Even if they did, differences across individuals would lead to different learning with respect to the
same exposure. The consequence is differences in knowledge and expertise across individuals.
To model this, let us begin by assuming that consumers differ only with respect to their expertise, and that they
are identical with respect to their tastes for product attributes. That is, different consumers j will be characterized
by different levels of z  X k A j  for each k. This will tend to result in different levels P  X k ( j ) for each
consumer; however, the direct log valuation components, P  X k D , will be the same for all. Appraisal expertise
may be defined in an overall sense based on the relative ability of different consumers in essence to fit (7) from
the X k using their conjectures about the z  X k .Specifically, consumer j’ is “more expert” than









2
2
j”if   z X k
 X k     z X k U ( j ")  X k  , where X k   X ki ; that is, if her weighted sum of squared
U ( j ')
k



k



i
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conjectural error is lower. (Note 4) Thus less-expert individuals, so defined, are more prone to errors in
distinguishing high-z brands from low-z brands.
The assumption of differences in expertise across consumers has implications for the distribution of consumers
across products. This may be seen by considering a simple example in which there are two brands, H and L, and
two consumers, j’ and j”. Assume H exhibits higher quality with respect to the unobserved characteristic, i.e.,
zH  zL .Suppose the two consumers have identical conjectures with respect to all the z  X k except for one,
and for that k’ let z X k ' U ( j ')  z X k ' U ( j ") .Thus consumer j” is less expert than j’. It follows that j” is more
likely than j’ to conclude erroneously that H is the low-quality product and L the high-quality product. Thus,
given any price pair for the two products, j” is more likely to choose L, all else being equal; that is, for a given
price, j” is more likely to conclude (erroneously) that L is the better buy based on her erroneous appraisal of z H
and z L . We can see that consumers who are more expert at appraisal will tend to sort to the high-quality product,
while inexpert consumers sort to the low-quality product. Sorting of consumers need not be perfect; however,
there will generally be differences in the average expertise of consumers across product pools correlated with the
level of unobservable characteristic.
Consumer sorting based on expertise levels has important empirical measurement implications. Recall that the
hedonic model requires homogeneous preferences. While this assumption has not been violated per se, the fact
that consumers exhibit differences in expertise means that the manifestation of their preferences is heterogeneous.
With preference heterogeneity, the hedonic relation taken over all consumers does not trace out a demand
function (Bajari & Benkard, 2005; Rosen, 1974). (Note 5) However, given sorting, it may be quite reasonable to
posit consumer homogeneity (or a close approximation) within product pools of a given quality level such that
the hedonic relation with respect to each pool traces out a demand function. If so, then the hedonic approach may
be appropriately applied separately on product subsamples that vary, using the terminology of our model, as to
the value of z.
Given the feasibility of hedonic regression on subsamples, it is possible to make inferences about consumers’
conjectures relating to the surrogate indicators. Our simple model illustrates. Let us use subscript E to represent
the relatively expert consumers that sort to the high-quality product, and I to represent the relative inexpert
consumers that sort to the low-quality product. Estimation of (3) restricted to high-quality products provides a
composite P  X k ( E ) for each k, while estimating the same equation for low-quality products provides
P  X k ( I ) . Using (8), we may write out the implicit components of the coefficients pertaining to experts and
inexpert consumers

P  X k ( E )  P  X k
P  X k ( I )  P  X k

D
D

 P z( E )  z  X k
 P z( I )  z  X k

(9)

A( E )

(10)

A( I )

where P z ( E ) and P z ( I ) represent, respectively, how experts and inexpert consumers collectively value
z while z  X k A( E ) and z  X k A( I ) represent the surrogate indicator capability that each group attributes to
X k .Note that we are unable to estimate these components directly: z is a constant for the high- and low-quality
subsamples, so we cannot include it in the equation. However, (9) and (10) do indicate that the difference in the
coefficient estimates for the constant term provides an estimate of P z( E )  P z ( I ) .
Subtracting (9) from (10) yields the relative biasin log valuation of inexpert consumers for each X k ,





P  X k ( I )  P  X k ( E )  P z( I )   P z( E ) dz dX k

A( I )

 P z( E )  dz dX k

U ( EI )

(11)

This bias is the sum of two components: inexpert consumers’ relative error in their log valuation of z, weighted
by their surrogate indicator conjecture about X k ; and their relative error about the role of X k as indicator,
dz dX k U ( EI )  dz dX k A ( E )  dz dX k A ( I ) , weighted by the experts’ log valuation of z. Note that dz dX k U ( EI )
represents a generalization of dz dX k U  dz dX k T  dz dX k A from the previous section, in which the
conjectures of the relative experts who sort to the high-quality product replace the total information content
represented by the subscript T. We observe that the intrinsic valuation of X k plays no role in the bias; this
follows from the presumption that all consumers have identical tastes for product attributes. Intuitively, the
relative bias tells us how log valuations of X k purely as a surrogate indicator differ for consumers sorting to
low-quality versus high-quality products.
24
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z
z
A corresponding relative conjectural error,  k ( EI )   X A ( I )  X A ( E ) , generalizes  k ; here, overshooting,
undershooting, and fallacy by inexpert consumers relative to the experts may be defined, respectively, as
 k ( EI )  1 ,  k ( EI )   0,1 , and  k ( EI )  0 .Whereas inferences could not drawn about  k , the sorting of
consumers allows us to draw inferences about  k ( EI ) , based on (11). Table 2 summarizes. Inferences depend
upon the sign of  P  X k ( I )   P  X k ( E ) , whether the unobservable characteristic is positively or negatively
valued, and whether X k is a significant positive or negative surrogate indicator with respect to the
unobservable characteristic based on estimation of (7). The table’s results depend additionally on the maintained
assumption that both experts and inexpert consumers consistently and correctly value z as positive or negative;
this enables us to posit P z ( E )   P z ( I )  0 for a positive z, and P z ( E )   P z ( I )  0 for a negative
z. We also maintain the assumption that expert consumers are sufficiently expert that they are not fallacious,
though the inexpert consumers could be.
k

k

Table 2. Inexpert consumers’ relative conjectural error with respect to X k

X k is a significant

X k is a significant

positive indicator

negative indicator

same sign

Large Overshoot

Fallacy, Undershoot, or
Small
Overshoot
(“FUSO”)

Indeterminate

∂P ∂X k(I) - ∂P ∂X k(E) , z

Fallacy, Undershoot, or
Small Overshoot (“FUSO”)

Large Overshoot

Indeterminate

∂P ∂X k(I) - ∂P ∂X k(E) , z

opposite sign

X k is insignificant

Table 2 shows that the researcher may mainly distinguish only situations in which inexpert consumers overshoot
substantially from situations in which they do not. For example, when a significant positive surrogate indicator
of a positively valued unobservable characteristic corresponds to a positive bias in inexpert consumers’ log
valuations, it is clear that inexpert consumers assign more surrogate indicator value to the characteristic than is
warranted. But when these conditions correspond to a negative bias, it is impossible to distinguish whether the
conjectural error is characterized by fallacy, undershoot, or even a small overshoot. A negative bias follows for
modest overshooting because a negative first term may overwhelm a positive second term in (11) (Note 6):
intuitively, the inexpert consumers’ failure to identify the positive unobservable characteristic when it is present
causes them to undervalue its presence in general. This drags down the surrogate indicator value of all
observable characteristics. Meanwhile, in the case of a variable not being a significant surrogate indicator as
revealed in the estimation of (7), the relative conjectural error is indeterminate: since we cannot reject the
hypothesis that the observable characteristic in question is unhelpful as an indicator, we are unable to determine
whether inexpert consumers have over- or under-relied upon it as such.
4. An Application: The Market for Black Cohosh
A topical exemplar of the uncertainty problem consumers face when a key product quality variable is
unobservable, the market for the dietary supplement black cohosh provides the data we will use for
demonstrating the method presented in the previous section. With overall sales of dietary supplements in the
United States estimated at $28.7 billion in 2010 and continuing to grow rapidly, (Note 7) research results relating
to black cohosh and similar products have potentially far-reaching significance.
4.1 Background
A plant native to North America, black cohosh (Latin name Actaea racemosa, formerly Cimicifuga racemosa)
was used historically by Native Americans for a number of medicinal purposes. Over the past 50 years it has
gained popularity in Europe, and more recently in North America, as an herbal supplement for treating
menopausal symptoms. Randomized clinical trials studying the effects of black cohosh have produced mixed
results, some showing benefit, and others not (Kronenberg & Fugh-Berman, 2002; Fabricant & Farnsworth,
2005; Borrelli & Ernst, 2008). Yet, despite the uncertainty associated with the trial findings, black cohosh
remains very popular, ranked recently as one of the top 10 dietary supplements based on retail sales in the United
States (Cavaliere, Rea, Lynch, & Blumenthal, 2009). Continued strong interest in this supplement suggests that
consumers generally believe it to be effective in treating menopause.
25
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As a dietary supplement, black cohosh is subject to regulation in the United States by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) under the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act (DSHEA). Following DSHEA’s
main premise, the rules that cover labeling and good manufacturing practices for dietary supplements more
closely resemble those that govern foods than the FDA’s rigorous drug regulations. Accordingly, supplements
require no premarket clinical testing or approval. Since DSHEA was enacted in 1994, the number of products to
which it has applied has grown from 4,000 to approximately 30,000. Over the same period, FDA funding for
supplement oversight has declined. Consequently, the agency has recently faced severe constraints in its efforts
to enforce its rules against supplement mislabeling and contamination (Wechsler, 2007).
Mislabeling of black cohosh has been recently documented. In a laboratory study of 11 products labeled as pure
black cohosh, Jiang, Kronenberg, Nuntanakorn, Qiu, & Kennelly (2006) detected adulteration in four. Three of
these products contained marker compounds for a lower-cost Asian Actaea species, but not those expected for
American black cohosh. The fourth contained both Asian Actaea and American black cohosh. The medicinal
uses of Asian Actaea differ from those of American black cohosh, and the health consequences of substitution
are not known (National Pharmacopoeia Committee, 2005, p. 50).
Given lax product quality and truth-in-labeling regulation, it seems appropriate to view product authenticity as a
relevant, unobservable quality variable over which consumers of black cohosh experience real uncertainty. This
uncertainty and the consumer inference problem it creates are likely compounded by the lack of dispositive
evidence concerning the effectiveness of even authentic black cohosh.
4.2 Data
We visited 20 stores in New York City and the lower Hudson River Valley and collected non-promotional retail
prices for all black cohosh tablet, caplet, capsule, and softgel products sold in the stores. (Note 8) We included
only “single-herb” black cohosh, excluding multi-product formulations that combined black cohosh with other
potentially active ingredients, such as vitamins or soy isoflavones. Some of the products sampled were sold at
multiple stores, resulting in multiple price observations per product in certain cases. In total, 55 price
observations were made representing 38 distinct products labeled as black cohosh. (Note 9)
In addition to the price data, other publicly observable product information was obtained. For each distinct
product, we collected all the information appearing on the label, including ingredients lists and the precise
wording of all label verbiage. Using standard Internet search techniques (e.g., Google), we also found and
collected online consumer ratings of the brands represented. (Note 10) All data on observable characteristics
were collected during the summer and fall of 2007.
To measure product authenticity, we conducted a laboratory analysis of the 38 products, following the procedure
described by Jiang et al. (2006, pp. 3243-3245). Specifically, we employed a combined method of
high-performance liquid chromatography – photodiode array detection (HPLC-PDA) and selected ion
monitoring liquid chromatography – mass spectrometry (SIM LC-MS).The method observes multiple ions in the
products in order to evaluate whether the products contain black cohosh. The results of the authentication
analysis were roughly consistent with Jiang et al.’s results.25 out of the 38 products were found to contain black
cohosh, while the other 13 did not. Thus, approximately 66% of products contained black cohosh in the current
study, as compared to 73% analyzed by Jiang et al. For obvious reasons, we withhold identifying information on
the products studied, though in what follows we do report average prices and regression results incorporating the
authenticity data.
In all, in addition to PRICE (the retail price) and AUTHENTICITY (binary indicator of whether the product
contained black cohosh or not), the following variables were populated for each observation:
1)
NYC, a dummy variable indicating whether the store where the price was observed was located in
New York City;
2)
RETAILER BRAND, a dummy variable indicating whether the product is a retailer’s brand (e.g.,
Whole Foods, Vitamin Shoppe);
3)

INGREDIENTS, the number of commonly-perceived “active” ingredients listed on the label;

4)
VEGGIE, a dummy variable indicating whether the product is suitable for vegetarians, based on the
ingredients or an explicit label affirmation;
5)
KOSHER, a dummy variable indicating whether the product is kosher, based on an explicit label
affirmation;
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6)
STANDARDIZED, a dummy variable indicating whether the label claims the product contains a
standardized component or set of components, as determined by industry-recognized methods (a quality
assurance measure);
7)

SIDE EFFECTS, a dummy variable indicating whether the label warns of side effects;

8)
SAFE, a dummy variable indicating whether the label contains the word “safe” or some derivative
(e.g., “safely”);
9)
RATED, a dummy variable indicating whether an online consumer rating could be located for the
particular brand of black cohosh;
10)
SUM OF RATINGS, the total of the ratings located for the brand (with individual ratings
normalized to a 1-point scale);
11)
TIME SUPPLY, the number of days of supplement supplied per package, calculated as the number
of units (e.g., tablets) per package divided by the number of units per day in the recommended dosage (or the
maximum number of units per day in those cases where a range was given);
12)

CERTIFIED, a dummy variable indicating whether the label contains the word “certified”;

13)
GUARANTEED, a dummy variable indicating whether the label contains the word “guarantee” or
some derivative;
14)
CLAIMS, a dummy variable indicating whether the label makes an affirmative therapeutic claim
with respect to a specific symptom.
Table 3. Displays descriptive statistics for our data (Note 11)
Full sample (N = 55)
PRICE
NYC
RETAILER BRAND
INGREDIENTS
VEGGIE
KOSHER
STANDARDIZED
SIDE EFFECTS
SAFE
RATED
TIME SUPPLY
CERTIFIED
GUARANTEED
CLAIMS
AUTHENTICITY
Subsample of online-rated products (N = 22)
SUM OF RATINGS
See text for description of variables

Mean

St. Dev.

Min.

Max

12.782
0.764
0.164
1.018
0.418
0.055
0.745
0.291
0.182
0.400
47.267
0.091
0.345
0.345
0.727

6.404
0.429
0.373
0.135
0.498
0.229
0.440
0.458
0.389
0.494
39.550
0.290
0.480
0.480
0.449

4.790
0.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
2.250
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

28.990
1.000
1.000
2.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
240.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

9.277

7.298

0.800

15.980

4.3 Surrogate Indicator Estimation on the Full Sample
Measurement of inexpert consumers’ relative conjectural errors requires two sets of estimates: full-sample
estimates of the role of the observable product characteristics in indicating unobservable authenticity; and
hedonic estimates on authentic and non-authentic product subsamples to obtain the log valuations of the
observable characteristics by expert and inexpert consumers, respectively. To obtain the former, we estimated(7),
including all variables #1-14 for the X k .The results are shown in Table 4.As discussed in Section 3, these
results show the true empirical relationship of the observables to unobserved authenticity: true positive indicators
(e.g., KOSHER) take positive signs, while true negative indicators (e.g., STANDARIZED) take negative signs.
The relationship that inexpert consumers infer between the observables and authenticity will tend to differ from
what the results in Table 4 show.
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Table 4. Full-sample regression results - indicators of authenticity
Dependent variable: Authenticity
NYC

-0.2639b
(0.1189)
-0.6625a
(0.2222)
-1.3011b
(0.5383)
-0.0586
(0.1225)
0.6226b
(0.2955)
-0.6085a
(0.1440)
-0.2922
(0.1925)
0.0316
(0.1694)
0.1294
(0.1734)
0.0265b
(0.0124)
-0.0005
(0.0018)
-0.3733c
(0.2175)
-0.5175a
(0.1607)
-0.3639b
(0.1648)
1.7898a
(0.2286)
55
0.6051

RETAILER BRAND
log of INGREDIENTS
VEGGIE
KOSHER
STANDARDIZED
SIDE EFFECTS
SAFE
RATED
SUM OF RATINGS
TIME SUPPLY
CERTIFIED
GUARANTEED
CLAIMS
Constant
N
R2
Standard errors are in parentheses
a

significant at 1%; bsignificant at 5%; csignificant at 10%

See text for description of variables
Several of the observable characteristics we tracked have a significant relationship to authenticity. It is
interesting to note that a number of label words that seem intended to reassure consumers about authenticity turn
out to be significant negative indicators of actual authenticity: CERTIFIED, GUARANTEED, and CLAIMS (as
well as STANDARDIZED) all take significant negative coefficients in the regression. There may be a number of
possible marketing explanations for why these words appear on labels. However, their persistent presence seems
to point to the inexpertise of a significant portion of consumers. After all, if consumers were all expert appraisers,
they would figure out quickly that these words counter-indicate authenticity and would tend to steer clear of the
associated products. This would then induce marketers to remove the words from their products’ labels.
It is also interesting to note that our X k , taken together, explain more than three-fifths of the total variation in
authenticity. It is fair to say that the potential appears to exist for effective appraisal of black cohosh by
knowledgeable consumers.
4.4 Hedonic Estimation on Quality-differentiated Subsamples: Inferences Based on Sorting
We now turn to the second component in our conjectural error measurement procedure: hedonic estimation on
the authentic and non-authentic product subsamples. We estimated (3), including again all variables #1-14 for
the X k . The first two columns of Table 5 display the results of this estimation. A number of the explanatory
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variables are omitted from the regressions for either the authentic or non-authentic model because they take a
constant value across the corresponding subsample, and so provide no variation as a basis for estimating a
coefficient. Their omission from the regression only affects the size of the constant term, and so has no relevance
to the coefficients on included explanatory variables. However, it makes it impossible to compare constant terms
between the models as a measure of the relative valuation of the unobservable characteristic, per our discussion
in Section 3.
Table 5. Hedonic regression results and estimates of relative bias in valuation and conjectural error
Dependent variable: log of PRICE
(1)
Authentic
Subsample
(OLS)
NYC
-0.1671c
(0.0968)
RETAILER BRAND
-1.4214a
(0.3069)
log of INGREDIENTS
Omitted
VEGGIE

0.2003
(0.1600)
KOSHER
-0.0233
(0.2418)
STANDARDIZED
0.2868
(0.1698)
SIDE EFFECTS
-0.0347
(0.1799)
SAFE
0.6069b
(0.2873)
RATED
-1.0207a
(0.2174)
SUM OF RATINGS
0.0512a
(0.0143)
TIME SUPPLY
0.0135a
(0.0033)
CERTIFIED
0.1185
(0.2351)
GUARANTEED
-0.3631b
(0.1729)
CLAIMS
-0.2532
(0.1819)
Constant
2.1782a
(0.2387)
N
40
R2
0.8196
Standard errors are in parentheses
a

(2)
Non-authentic
Subsample
(OLS)
Omitted

Relative Bias of
Inexpert
Consumers

Relative Conjectural
Error

-1.3401c
(0.5354)
Omitted

0.0813

FUSO

0.5907
(0.3413)
Omitted

0.3904

Indeterminate

0.9173

Indeterminate

-0.7860

Indeterminate

-0.8657

FUSO

-0.0046

Indeterminate

2.3051

FUSO

0.2804

FUSO

-0.2497

Large overshoot

Omitted
0.8826
(0.7771)
-0.1791
(0.8238)
Omitted
-0.8145
(0.4980)
0.0089b
(0.0028)
2.4236
(1.2730)
-0.0827
(0.4860)
-0.5029
(0.4860)
2.3967a
(0.4189)
15
0.7802

significant at 1%; bsignificant at 5%; csignificant at 10%

FUSO=fallacy, undershoot, or small overshoot
See text for description of variables. Variables that took constant values within a subsample were omitted from
the corresponding regression, as indicated.
There are stark differences in the coefficients estimated for the explanatory variables on the two subsamples.
Under the assumption that the buyers of authentic and non-authentic black cohosh do not differ in their intrinsic
valuation of observable characteristics, these differences represent differences in valuation of the observable
characteristics purely as surrogate indicators. Given that consumers more capable at appraising black cohosh
likely tend to sort to the authentic products, the coefficient differences may be characterized as representing the
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relative bias of the relatively inexpert consumers who buy the non-authentic products. We display this bias
explicitly in the third column of Table 5.
We use our relative bias measures and the decomposition in (11) to determine the relative conjectural error of the
inexpert consumers. We employ the classification in Table 2, taking the presumption that authenticity is a
positively valued quality, and using the information in Table 4 on which variables are significant positive or
significant negative surrogate indicators. The last column of Table 5 reports our findings.
With respect to most significant surrogate indicators, relatively inexpert consumers appear to undershoot – or
else, entertain fallacies or modestly overshoot – in their conjectures. This suggests either unawareness or
tentativeness about most of the indicators of authenticity. But there is one exception: inexpert consumers
overshoot substantially with respect to drawing negative inferences about authenticity from the presence of
specific therapeutic claims on the label. That is, while they correctly infer that therapeutic claims are a
significant negative indicator of authenticity, they place too much weight on them. We will discuss the possible
implications of this finding in the next section.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed a method for measuring the conjectural errors that inexpert consumers make with
respect to using observable characteristics as surrogate indicators of an unobservable product quality variable.
The approach uses data on the quality variable – observable to researchers, though not to consumers – as a basis
for creating subsamples for separate hedonic log-price regressions. Given the assumption that consumers sort
between high- and low-quality products based on their product appraisal expertise, such regressions yield distinct
marginal values accorded to observed characteristics by expert and inexpert consumers. Combining the estimates
with data on the actual empirical relationship of the quality variable to the indicators enables the researcher to
measure the conjectures of the expert and inexpert consumers, and the associated relative errors made by the
latter.
We applied this method to data on observable characteristics of a set of brands of the dietary supplement black
cohosh, paired to observations of consumer-unobservable product authenticity. We found that, whereas inexpert
consumers probably err on the side of being too tentative in their use of most surrogate indicators, they devalued
products making therapeutic claims on their labels more than experts did. Thus, while the presence of claims
correlate negatively with product authenticity, suggesting that they are appropriately viewed as a negative
indicator, inexpert consumers appear to have construed too much about authenticity from this variable. Bogus
supplement claims have received prominent treatment in the press, (Note 12) and it is possible that their
consequent salience causes some individuals, particularly those who are less skilled at appraising products, to
focus too much on them in their assessment of supplement quality. These same individuals may suboptimally
neglect other sources of information, including other product label cues.
From a managerial perspective, research along the lines of the methods demonstrated here may yield a number
of useful applications. Performing hedonic analysis separately on expert and inexpert consumers may allow
managers to develop targeted pricing strategies that account for differences in how these two groups value
product characteristics as indicators of unobservable qualities. Such findings may also allow for targeted product
and promotion strategies that emphasize product attributes of interest to each group. Observed differences in the
conjectural errors with respect to surrogate indicators that inexpert consumers make relative to experts provide
additional information for managers that may be useful in promotional targeting. In the market for black cohosh,
for example, managers might conclude from our study’s findings – perhaps tentatively, given its small sample –
that a product targeted to less sophisticated consumers should tone down therapeutic label claims (e.g., “ends hot
flashes within 48 hours”), whatever else the benefits of including such claims on the label might be. Products
marketed with such claims to unsophisticated consumers would have to be priced lower, all else equal.
Consistent with product labeling, advertisements of black cohosh products directed to inexpert individuals
should perhaps also eschew emphasis on the product’s therapeutic claims, while those directed to relatively
sophisticated consumers might not. As discussed in the introduction, there are many marketing contexts in which
researchers may gain access to relevant consumer-unobservable product characteristics across brands, allowing
for the techniques demonstrated in this paper to be applied quite broadly. Overall, our study highlights the value
of accounting for consumer-unobservable characteristics in marketing research.
Further work needs to be done. The present study was limited by its small sample size and should therefore be
considered largely as an initial proof of concept. In particular, the coefficient estimates associated with the two
subsamples likely included a substantial amount of noise, and our interpretations of the differences and the
associated conjectural errors should be weighted accordingly. The study was also limited by our reliance on list
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prices in place of transacted prices. For us to know definitively that consumers have valued a product at a certain
price, we would need to witness actual transactions at that price. Undoubtedly, a significant share of transactions
at the stores covered by our study occurred at list prices, but we do not know what share, nor do we know the
discounted prices that applied to the remaining transactions. In using list prices, we effectively assume that
discounting has been applied equally across all SKUs in the study, a characteristic that our study shares with
other hedonic analyses that have used list prices (e.g., Gandal, 1994; Roe et al., 2001).One objective for future
research would be to test the application of the study’s approach using scanner data. More generally, replication
of our method in other contexts would be helpful in demonstrating its uses. Product markets with prominent
experience and/or credence good qualities pose good candidates, particularly where important managerial or
policy issues remain unresolved.
One example involving provocative policy issues that relate to marketing practices and consumer welfare is the
market for illegal drugs. Public policy has focused on limiting supply through seizure, with mixed results.One
consequence of supply-chain pressure has been that sellers “cut” their product with baser substances before
selling it. (Note 13) In regard to reductions in drug purity and their implications for drug policy evaluation, a
number of questions need to be answered. To what extent do observable characteristics provide evidence of
adulterated products? What observable characteristics are most influential in stimulating recognition of
adulteration?Assuming some buyers are less sophisticated than others, what sorts of conjectural errors in drug
purity evaluation do inexpert buyers make relative to experts? Do supply-chain pressure and consequent effects
on drug purity have consequences for which type of buyer is predominantly purchasing the product?
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Notes
Note 1. Unawareness may be described by subjective state spaces that may contain full factual information but
lack awareness information necessary for reasoning with respect to relevant uncertainties. Thus, the agent
possesses facts, but they do not “ring a bell” in a way needed to make a relevant inference. Put another way, the
possibility of the inference does not “occur” to the agent. For discussions, see Heifetz, Meier, & Schipper (2006);
Li (2009); and Liu (2008).
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Note 2. We emphasize “express” here because, even though consumers may all have the same preferences over
characteristics, differences in expertise will cause consumers to act as if their preferences differ. This would
violate the requirements of the hedonic model. See Section 3.
Note 3. People obtain indications about unobservable product qualities from a number of sources, including
advertising content and intensity, consumption experiences, and prices (e.g., Erdem, Keane, & Sun, 2008); as
well as word-of-mouth communication by other consumers, including online product reviews (Godes & Mayzlin,
2004). Such sources of product indication may be viewed, in the context of our model, as augmenting
Lancaster’s (1966) model of “proper” product characteristics and extending the corresponding basis for hedonic
estimation.
Note 4. In fact, we expect that expertise in appraisal likely carries across all surrogate indicators, such that
people who make erroneous conjectures about one z X k will likely make larger errors about others. This is
consistent with the literature, which views expertise as accruing at the level of the overall product (Alba &
Hutchinson, 1987). For the purposes of this paper, it is not necessary to introduce this complication into the
modeling. However, the notion does provide motivation for thinking of expert and inexpert appraisers as
constituting distinct market segments.
Note 5. Rather, that relation depends on costs and a markup resulting from a complex relationship between the
heterogeneous preferences and the characteristics of competing offerings, whence the hedonic regression
becomes a reduced form in which the coefficients have no obvious interpretation in terms of economic
primitives. See Pakes (2003).
Note 6. For this reason, a correctly signed bias term (i.e., the same sign as z when X k is a significant positive
indicator, the opposite sign when X k is a significant negative indicator) is sufficient for identifying
overshooting consumers, that is, the bias term need not be significantly different from zero. However, if X k is
insignificant, the relative conjectural error of consumers is indeterminate, regardless of the sign of X k .
Note 7. See Mast (2011).
Note 8. Our use of list prices follows other hedonic studies (e.g., Gandal, 1994; Roe, Teisl, Levy, & Russell,
2001). The limitations of using list prices instead of actual transacted prices, which were unable to observe for
this study, are discussed in Section 5.
Note 9. A distinct product consists of a specific brand with a certain number of units per package, a certain
formulation (e.g., tablet, liquid-filled capsule, etc.), and a distinct set of ingredients.
Note 10. Online retailers of dietary supplements, such as Amazon and drugstore.com, and dedicated review sites,
such as Buzzillions.com, invite consumers to write product reviews. Typically any visitor to the site can write
one. The review process is structured to allow the consumer both to offer a written comment and a numeric
rating, usually on a 5-point scale. The comment and rating are then posted to the website for other visitors to
view.
Note 11. Note that while approximately 66% of distinct products in our sample were determined to be authentic,
authentic products accounted for roughly 73% of our observations. This is because authentic products were
slightly oversampled across retailers relative to non-authentic products.
Note 12. See, for example, Gomstyn (2010).
Note 13. For an extended discussion, see Letizia, Greenfield, & Reuter (2009).
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